Abstract-This paper shows that, viewed in a generalized "two-hop" framework for node failure recovery, p-cycles actually have a very high inherent ability to restore paths transiting through a failed node. We also showed that with relatively little, if any, extra spare capacity, the principle is also amenable to explicit design of networks for 100% node and span failure protection with a single efficient set of pcycles that support both functions. This is very different than the often-prevailing assumption that "ordinary" pcycles offer no node protection, or only the same nodeprotection as a BLSR ring embodies. Indeed, the two-hop paradigm for recovery of affected paths transiting failed nodes could provide an attractive option for future network operators in that "ordinary" p-cycles are more localized, fast acting, and simple to plan and operate than any other option such as NEPCs, flow-protecting p-cycles or FIPPs.
INTRODUCTION
Network survivability design is primarily focused on recovery from span failures because the frequencies of fiber cable cut events are hundreds to thousands of times higher than corresponding reports of transport layer node failures. Nevertheless much less frequent than span failures, node outages are particularly harmful when they arise, at least because each specific node failure involves the simultaneous failure of all node-incident edges. On the other hand, if optical-cross-connects (OXCs) tend to be highly robust and well protected, IP/MPLS routers still suffer downtimes about as frequently as span failures because of software' patches, upgrades or even crashes. Thus, it is not utopian to consider protection against both span and node failures in the design.
Doing so, it has been known that end-to-end pathprotecting architectures such as shared backup path protection (SBPP), demand-wise shared protection (DSP) and pre-cross-connected trails (PXT) inherently provide some protection against intermediate node failures arising somewhere along the working paths. Corresponding levels of node failure restorability depend on backup channel-capacities and node-disjointness considerations in the shared risk link groups (SRLGs). In contrast to path-oriented paradigms, span-protecting architectures are based on the deployment of a set of backup pathsegments between the end-nodes (i.e., the "custodial" nodes) of a given failed span. Thus, integrating node failure recovery in span-protecting networks is much more challenging than with path-oriented protection.
If bidirectional-line-switched-rings (BLSRs) and unidirectional-path-switched rings (UPSRs) are recognized an inherent ability to recover paths transiting through a failed node, within the surviving portion of the ring, node failure protection using span-oriented paradigms in mesh-based survivable networks requires (in fact) some extensions of the original principle. A related illustration is the node-inclusive span survivability (NISS) scheme for span restoration in [2] . The key idea behind NISS is to define two custodial regions, one hop away from custodial nodes with respect to each possible span failure. Doing so, a related, relatively small and localized instance of the path restoration problem can be solved for any failure affecting each given node-inclusive span entity (i.e., each span plus its custodial nodes). p-Cycles are now a fairly known span-protecting scheme, with many interesting and attractive properties [3] - [5] . The original intention with span-protecting or "ordinary" p-cycles (as opposed to more recent FIPP pcycles [13] - [18] ) is efficient and fast protection against single span failures. A subsequent and common misunderstanding is that span-protecting p-cycles offer no form of node protection. More correctly, since inception, it has been realized that p-cycles do offer inherently the same protection to on-cycle paths traversing a failed node, as does a BLSR with respect to paths in the ring [6] - [7] .
What has, however, remained less clear is how to protect paths that transit a node on a p-cycle and which have straddling relationship to the respective p-cycle. To protect those straddling paths against node failures as well, there have been various extensions to the basic node-protecting property of p-cycles. One main idea explored for node protection with p-cycles is the "nodeencircling" principle studied and developed in, for example, ( [6] , [8] - [9] ). Another line of work partly motivated by including node protection has lead to extensions of the whole p-cycle concept into pathsegment or so-called "flow-protecting" p-cycles [10] - [11] , and to end-to-end path protection with p-cycles [13] - [18] .
Overall this contribution is extended from [1] . We explain and explore a two-hop flow strategy to node failure protection using ordinary p-cycles, which seems to have been overlooked to date. Section II presents the twohop flow concept and compares this with prior related concepts. Section III formulates an integer-linearprogramming (ILP) design model for the two-hop flow strategy, recalls equivalent ILP mathematical models for prior approaches, and proposes an adaptation of a novel combination of genetic-algorithms (GA) and ILP methods ( [18] - [20] ) to address large scale instances.
Section IV presents case studies, the test methodology and experimental results. Section V concludes the paper and indicates possible lines of future direction.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND RELATED WORK

A. Two-Hop Flow: a New Insight and Approach to
Node Failure Recovery using Ordinary p-Cycles In brief, this contribution is to observe that the BLSRlike loopback reaction that ordinary p-cycles make to restore on-cycle flows transiting through a node is actually also applicable to straddling flows failing at a pcycle node if the two spans adjacent to the failure node both end on another nodes on the same p-cycle. Of course, in hindsight, this is always true for on-cycle flows transiting a node; so this is a generalization of the prior known BLSR-like node protection condition. But the more general criteria can be seen to also allow protection of the following additional cases (with ordinary p-cycles) shown in Fig. 1 . Fig. 1 actually illustrates how an ordinary spanprotecting p-cycle can restore any 2-hop path-segment intersecting the cycle structure upstream and downstream of a given failed node, whether or not the 2-hop flowsegment is entirely on the protecting structure. In Fig.  1(a) , we have a p-cycle under the normal network state. In Fig. 1(b) -(e), we show how that p-cycle can be used to react in a previously overlooked way under node failure circumstances. The only requirement is that the endnodes of the two-hop segment are on the same p-cycle as each other. So, Fig. 1(f) captures the class of situation where at least one end-node of the two hop-segment under consideration is not part of the cycle structure; this cannot be covered by the novel general criterion of node failure recovery.
In Fig. 1(b) -(e), the failure scenarios specifically consider whether the 2-hop segment is entirely on the protecting structure as in Fig. 1(b) , or if the p-cycle crosses only one of the spans of the 2-hop segment as shown in Fig. 1(c) , or if both spans of the 2-hop pathsegment straddle the cycle as in Fig. 1(d) , or if only the end-nodes of the 2-hop flow are part of the cycle structure as shown in Fig. 1(e) . One way to think about this is to consider any 2-hop flow as a kind of "virtual span": doing so the three cases in Fig. 1(b)-(d) are all equivalent to on-cycle (span) failures; while the situation in Fig. 1(e) , in which neither of the two spans comprising the 2-hop segment nor the failed node are part of the cycle, corresponds to a p-cycle reacting to a straddling (span) failure.
The practical importance of the 2-hop standpoint is that the simplicity of operation of ordinary p-cycles is retained and only one set of span-protecting candidate structures can be employed in a complete design for both 100% span and node failure protection. Subsequently, the 2-hop strategy stands in contrast with prior attempts to protect against node failure events through concepts such as node-encircling p-cycles (NEPCs- [6] , [8] - [9] ), full path-segment (or more simply "flow") protecting pcycles [10] - [11] , and failure-independent path-protecting (FIPP) p-cycles [13] to [18] .
B. Two Hops versus Node-Encircling p-Cycles
A p-cycle is said to be an NEPC for a given "encircled" node if it contains all the neighbor-nodes of the encircled node, but not the given node itself. Thus the key property is that, an NEPC intercepts any flow transiting the encircled node, and hence (with suitable capacity) can reroute all affected transiting flows when the node fails. For example, the p-cycle in Fig. 2(a) is an NEPC for node G and, as shown in Fig. 2(b) , intercepts every path transiting through the encircled node G. In contrast, the given p-cycle cannot be an NEPC for other vertices of the graph because nodes A, I, D, E, F and H are themselves part of the protecting structure; while offcycle nodes B and C are neighbors each other and thus, B has its neighbor-nodes C (and C its neighbor node B) out of the cycle structure. Fig. 2 The Concept of NEPCs requires significantly more spare capacity in the complete design because the NEPCs provide for node recovery separately from other p-cycles which are still needed for span protection.
The 2-hop strategy is more flexible than NEPCs. By considering failed-segments of (only) two hops, we eliminate the node-encircling constraint. Instead, for every potential node failure scenario, we select a subset of ordinary cycles that cover (if considered together) all the neighborhood of the failed node-rather than looking for NEPCs of the failed node. Results to follow show much greater overall capacity efficiency as well.
C. Two Hops versus Flow-Protecting p-Cycles
In other prior work, full path-segment (or flow) protecting p-cycles can also support node failure recovery. The principle is to observe that every p-cycle will also happen to intersect a number of working flows upstream and downstream. Subsequently, any intermediate node or span failure along each respective intersecting flow-segment can be restored within the pcycle, exactly as with the conventional switching mechanism. For instance, Fig. 3 Flow-protecting p-cycles generalize the 2-hop strategy in the sense that protected segments may freely go from one or more spans to entire working paths. But by restricting failed flows to be considered and restored strictly only as if they were two-hop segments, we only require the same simple and local type of failure detection and pre-defined switching plans as for span failures. To illustrate, the situation in Fig. 3 (c) requires advanced inter-nodal signaling or centralized management to activate the right restoration actions, which are different depending on where the failed path-segment is disrupted-i.e. whether along ]B,F[ or [F,D[. However, if the added complexity of a failuredependent reaction is accepted, we recently showed that very high levels of node failure restorability could be achieved by applying a path-segment view to ordinary span-protecting p-cycles [12] .
D. Two Hops vis-à-vis Failure-Independent Path-
Protecting p-Cycles Although this requires switching from span-to pathoriented paradigms, failure-independent path-protecting (FIPP) p-cycles with proper node-disjointness constraints also stand as a valid alternative approach to node failure protection using p-cycles. FIPP p-cycles actually operate like conventional p-cycles but they are chosen so that each protects a set of end-to-end paths that are mutually span-(and when desired, node-) failure disjoint between end-nodes on the FIPP structure [13] - [14] . Literature indicates disjoint-route-sets (DRS) and columngeneration (CG) as practical methods for FIPP network planning [15] - [17] .
When FIPP failure independency constraint is relaxed so that a given working path can be assigned different pcycles depending on where the failure occurs, the principle is referred as general path-protecting (GPP) pcycles. It has been shown in prior research that optimal GPP solutions are very close to being FIPP solutions because in general, no more than 2 working paths remain unprotected after the constraint of failure independence is imposed onto GPP designs [18] . Thus as is the case in this paper, it is not awkward to consider GPPs as if they were FIPPs. The merit is that relative to FIPP p-cycles, GPPs can be very efficiently captured in a mathematical formulation.
III. MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING ASPECTS
The conventional p-cycle minimum spare capacity design model is given as starting point.
A. Conventional p-Cycle Minimum Spare Capacity
Design Model The following definitions serve for the p-cycle minimum spare capacity design model.
Sets: is the number of working channels to be protected on span i. This is an input arising from whatever routing process is employed for demand matrix. (
Subject to:
B. ILP Models for the 2-Hop Approach to Node
Failure Protection using Ordinary p-Cycles The following additional definitions serve for the ILP maximizing R 1-node in p-cycle designs.
Additional Sets: N is the set of nodes in the network, indexed by k. D is the set of demands, indexed by r. We assume all units for a given demand-pair r take the same working route.
Additional Input Parameters:
is the number of units of capacity for demandpair r. 
statistics on affected, transiting and recovered traffic. The following inequality is always true:
ILP Formulation:
1) Maximizing Node Failure Restorability Level in a Conventionally Designed p-Cycle Network
An assumption to this first new ILP is to keep as is the routing of working paths, the spare capacity and the pcycles selected in an otherwise conventional p-cycle minimum spare capacity design. And the objective is to maximize node failure restorability as stated in Eq (4). To calculate node failure recovery level-Eq. (5) allocates restoration path-segments, available within the selected p-cycles, to working paths transiting the intermediate node of any 2-hop segment. Doing so, Eq. (6) asserts that only intersecting flows are potentially restorable. Eq. (7) keeps the assignment of protection path-segments under the actual spare capacity of available p-cycles. And Eq. (8) gives no credit to potentially protected paths that would exceed the actual demand volume present.
Eqs. (9)- (11) are for statistics only: they respectively record the demand volume affected by a given node outage, the amount that is potentially restorable because transiting the failed node, and the number of working paths that are effectively protected in the design. Node failure restorability is given by 1-node 
: 0
,
2) R 1-node Maximization with Controlled or No Penalties over Minimum Spare Capacity Requirements
Rather than maximizing node failure recovery in a preplanned 100% span restorable p-cycle network, we can nudge the minimum spare capacity solution to happen to support simultaneously the maximum feasible level of node failure restorability. Setting a suitable small α, this is achievable with the bi-criteria objective in Eq. (12) and the constraints (2)- (3) and (5)- (11) .
One might want to assert, instead, maximum R 1-node subject to an allowable extra budget ξ relative to the minimum spare capacity cost B for 100% restorability against single span failures. If so, Eq. (13) will be accordingly added to the prior set of constraints and Eq. (4) will be then considered as objective function.
(1
In a different way, one can also ask how much spare capacity is required at minimum to guarantee 100% restorability against both node and span failures. The equivalent ILP is given by Eqs. (1)- (11), without the objective function in Eq. (4), and the new constraint (14) that transforms the inequality (8) 
3) Multiple Quality of Protection Concerns
The above-defined mathematical formulations are easily adaptable to multiple quality-of-protection (multiQoP) purposes. Assume that a new input parameter identifies three service classes requiring: (14) will stand for and , respectively. Given that node failure recovery levels are known to be 0 and 100% for the first and third service classes, statistics in Eqs. 
C. Equivalent ILP Formulations for Prior Node
Restoration Options with p-Cycles
1) Flow-Protecting p-Cycles and NEPCs
All prior-defined ILPs are applicable as is to the cases of flow-protecting p-cycles and NEPCs. The principle is just to recognize that each p-cycle has its own spans for which it provides the intended span failure protection but exploits and/or adjusts the design in a way that p-cycles also act as 2-hop protecting p-cycles, flow-protecting pcycles or NEPCs when it comes to prevent node failures. From the flow-protecting p-cycle perspective, the parameter , p r k μ has to be pre-processed for full pathsegments (of one or more spans to entire working paths represents the number of copies of p-cycle p assigned to demand-pair r in the design. 
ILP Formulation:
The conventional p-cycle minimum spare capacity design model is not applicable to GPP p-cycles, because the latter requires to switch from span-to path-based protection. To achieve full span restorable GPP designs, Eqs. (1) and (3) 
Regarding node failure protection purposes, Eq. (18) is an equivalent of Eq. (17) but for node-disjointness requirements. The assignment of protection segments within available p-cycles, previously done by Eqs. (5)- (6) , is now achieved by Eq. (19) . Eq. (20) calculates cycle copies required in the design, and all Eqs. (7)- (14) remain the same.
, Bicriteria minimization of capacity and node unrestorability-Eqs. (12), (2)- (3), (5)- (11). 4 R 1-node maximization with controlled penalties over minimum capacity.
Merge models 1 and 2 plus extra budget-Eqs. (2)- (11), (13) .
5*
Full protection against both span and node failures.
Capacity minimization under full R 1-node -Eqs.
(1)- (3), (5)- (7), (9)- (11), (14) . 6
Multi-QoP services for R 1-node .
Merge models 3 and 5-Eqs. (2)- (3), (5)- (12), (14) .
7
Service differentiation for NEPCs.
Model 6 for NEPCsEqs. (2)- (3), (5)- (11), (15).
8
GPP p-cycle minimum spare capacity.
Model 1 for GPP-Eqs.
(1), (3), (16)-(17). 9-13** Similar to models 2-6, but for GPP.
Eqs involved- (1), (3)- (4), (7)- (14), (16)- (20) .
ILP models 1 to 4 apply to 2-hop, flow and NEPC node failure protection strategies. *Model 5 is for 2-hops and flows only; and has no equivalence for NEPCs. **Although in vrac, eqs. for ILPs 9 to 13 are picked up similarly to models 2 to 6. Table 1 gives a summary ILP mathematical design models. All of them were implemented in AMPL 10.100 and solved using CPLEX 10.1.0 with a mixed integer programming gap for optimality (MIPGAP) of 10 -4 , on an Intel Duo Core Processor running Mac OS X 10.5.8 at 2.8 GHz with 4 GB of 1067 MHz DDR3. Where ILP problem instances were solvable with the complete set of candidate cycles, the whole process (including preparatory programs) typically reached full termination in about 15 minutes or less.
We managed the size of large problem instances by restraining the number of eligible cycles. Our preselection technique relates to a novel combination of GA with ILP methods which seems to have many features to recommend it for any large p-cycle problem involving the selection of a relatively few optimal candidate cycles from an almost infinite space. Note that this added (only) a couple more minutes in running times for network instances under consideration in this paper.
D. A GA-ILP Heuristic to Solving Node-Protecting p-Cycle ILPs at Very Large Scale
The GA-ILP preselection concept follows the normal steps of a GA-like evolutionary heuristic. The initial set of candidates is first partitioned into subsets of equal sizes, each subset comprising an individual of which genome corresponds to the index numbers of the cycles constituting the subset in question. The union of the above individuals then embodies an initial population for the GA-ILP, and the node-protecting p-cycle problem under consideration is solved using in turn each of the individuals. Every individual is subsequently assigned a weight equivalent to the objective function value of the constituent ILP and the n/2 individual-pairs showing the optimum sum of weights are selected for breeding. Every selected pair of individuals produces two children by crossing the first half of one parent's genome with the second half of the second individual's genome and vice versa. To maintain genetic diversity into the offspring, there is a specific mutation policy that consists of randomly substituting cycle indexes in some children for solution cycles of the individuals not selected to reproduce. The generational process of evaluation, selection, crossover and mutation is repeated on new populations, until the objective function value of the constituent ILP does not improve anymore from one individual to another. All unique cycles of the last population then comprise the reduced set of candidates that is still, to our knowledge, O(individual size).
Whereas the space of all possible candidates is fully enumerable, the GA-ILP solution to a conventional pcycle network design problem is expected to be equivalent to what would be obtained if the instance under consideration was solved with the entire set of candidate cycles. As a form of test, in work presented at [21] we showed that even for almost 85,000 candidate structures, the GA-ILP always reaches optimality for problem instances to which exact (ILP) solutions are known. But the purpose for GA-ILP is to go onto much larger problem sizes where enumeration is not practically possible. In this regard, we can actually recognize [21] two additional problem classes based on whether the space of all possible candidate cycles is enumerable but impractical to import into the ILP solver, or not even enumerable in practice. The GA-ILP provided a high quality solution for an instance of about 387,740 candidates. In fact, that solution was found equal (within the MIPGAP being employed) to what was obtained using the CG approach, meaning that the GA-ILP was still within 1% of optimality. In other prior work, we successfully applied the GA-ILP framework for p-cycle network designs with controlled optical path length in the restored network state [19] , for near-optimal FIPP p-cycle network designs through GPP [18] , and to a 200-node challenge case which represents a specific instance of the third class of problems [20] .
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Case Studies
Five test case networks, shown in Fig. 4 , were used. The first group of columns in Table 2 gives their number of nodes |N|, spans |S|, demand-pairs |D| and eligible cycles |P|. "Havana" in Fig. 4(a) is a previously used network [22] . Two sets of demands are considered for it: the original matrix of 58 demand-pairs with units distributed on the interval [0. A shortest distance based routing is applied under most normal network states, resulting in total working channelkms of 23,934 for Havana when considering the original set of demands; 2,595,800 for Havana using the large traffic matrix; 137,170 for Cost 239; 62,232 for Italy; 18,335.1 for Bellcore; and 246,375 for Euro network. There is one more Havana network instance in which a hop-count based routing is applied to the original demand matrix; this leads to 166 working channels. The 3 rd and 4 th columns report statistics on paths affected by potential node failure events and the number of such paths that can be considered for restoration-the ratio of transiting over total paths (including terminating paths which cannot be restored) varies from 25 to 60%. Six types of results are considered here to assess effectiveness of the proposed "two-hop" node recovery principle. In a first set of experiments corresponds to models 1 and 8, in which nothing special is done for node failure recovery in the design. These are test cases designed for R 1-span = 1 at minimum spare capacity. Within each network, we then use the 2 nd and 9 th ILPs to simulate each node failure and experimentally determine what is the best R 1-node level that can be obtained through the two-hop and other comparative node recovery methods. Further types of result obtained with models 3 and 10 show the level of R 1-node that is achievable "for free" under each principle (i.e., with no investment beyond that needed only for R 1-span = 1; but free to bias the solution towards choosing cycles that also increase R 1-node levels). With enhanced ILPs 4 and 11, we maximize node failure protection under given spare capacity budgets. The 5 th and 12 th ILP-based results are to see how much spare capacity has to be added to strictly assert 100% R 1-node by each method being compared. The final type of results relates to service differentiation and is achievable with the 6 th , 7 th and 13 th ILPs.
B. Performance of the 2-Hop Strategy
The 2 nd column of Table 3 gives conventional p-cycle minimum spare capacity design solutions for each of the networks under consideration; these are 100% span restorable only, with no node failure concerns. The 3 rd and 4 th columns in Table 3 characterize node failure protection aspects, using each of the different node restoration options. More specifically, the 3 rd columns show R 1-node levels that are achievable in networks designed for minimum spare capacity but with enhanced R 1-node in mind. And the 4 th columns report the amounts of added capacity (over min-costs) required to reach 100% restorability against both single span and node failures. Let us first consider the 2-hop flow performance in the first series of data in the 3 rd and 4 th columns of Table 3 . 
Fig. 4 Five Test Case Networks
Overall, very high levels of R 1-node , typically 77% to 96% are achieved under min-costs. Moreover, with additional capacity penalties of 0.89 to 21% we can achieve full node restorability, using the ILP for 100% R 1-node . Fig. 5 gives a deeper analysis of the "Havana" network with the original traffic matrix of 58 demandpairs over shortest distance routes. The x-axis indicates each node failure scenario and the 1 st set of data (i.e., blue histogram) records the corresponding numbers of affected paths. Frankfurt and Hanover have the most impact on the network as each failure affects 37 working paths. In contrast, failures of Bremen and Norden have the least impact on the network, with 4 affected paths each. Overall, there are 271 combinations of node failures and affected working paths. The second histogram bars (i.e., red) in Fig. 5 indicate the number of paths that are potentially restorable because they are "transiting" through a failed node. For example, Dortmund failure affects 26 working paths, but only 9 of those can be considered for restoration because the 17 others are terminating demands at that node. The blanks in Berlin, Hamburg, Munchen and Norden arise because none of the failed paths are transiting those nodes. In totality, 77 failed paths are potentially restorable. The 3 rd set of data (i.e., yellow) in Fig. 5 reports maximum achievable levels of single node failure restorability in the conventional design, initially planned for 100% span failure restorability only with no node failure concerns. All working paths transiting failed nodes other than Bremen and Hanover are fully restorable. Bremen and the degree-6 Hanover are respectively 50% and 82% node restorable. Overall, a total of 74 paths (out of 77) survive single node failure conditions, for a very high level of up to 96% R 1-node . And this can be pushed to 100%, using the 5 th ILP for assertion of 100% R 1-node , with less than 1% of additional spare capacity requirements. (The conventional p-cycle minimum spare capacity design solution for Havana involves 16 channel-copies of 4 distinct p-cycle structures, for spare capacity requirements of 20,264 channel-kms corresponding to 84.56% of redundancy to total distance-weighted working capacity.) transiting paths in the node payload characterization previously shown in Fig. 5 . The 11 working paths thus correspond to the maximum achievable R 1-node of 14%, which requires about 39% of extra spare capacity over min-costs. The usage of non-simple cycles is necessary to achieve an R 1-node of 100%. In contrast to NEPCs, the path-segment strategy greatly improves on both maximum R 1-node under min-costs and spare capacity penalties to reach 100% R 1-node . (Another bench of comparison, based on the 4 th ILP, is given in Fig. 6 for Havana and Cost239 network; y-axis maximizes R 1-node under extra spare capacity indicated in x-axis).
GPP involves shifting from span to path protection, so the related minimum spare capacity design solutions differ from that of conventional span-protecting p-cycles (otherwise used as benchmark for 2-hops, flows and NEPCs). Comparative min-cost solutions are both given in the 2 nd column of Table 3 . Overall, results seem to suggest that FIPP gives rise to least costs for instance cases involving more candidate cycles while conventional p-cycles are more adapted to smaller candidate spaces. For example, the Havana minimum capacity GPP-design solution is 100% R 1-node ; there is however an indirect penalty as GPP minimum spare capacity design (i.e. 20,451 channel-kms) is more expensive than that of ordinary p-cycles (i.e. 20,264 channel-kms). Furthermore, in these test networks at least, GPP min-cost requirements are even higher than what is required to reach full node restorability using either flows (i.e., 20,335) or 2-hops (i.e., 20,444).
D. Performance under Multi-QoP Requirements
Overall, the 2-hop strategy shows such a great performance that it seems to be a promising mixed priority service environments. Table 4 records multi-QoP experimental results for Havana network with the original traffic matrix and the shortest distance routing. As shown in the first row, four scenario types were considered: no node failure protection, maximum failure protection under minimum spare capacity requirements, 100% node failure restorability and several mixed scenarios.
To distribute traffic among service classes for the scenario (50, 30, 20) , for example, we randomly generated a number on the interval [1. .100], considering in turn each demand-pair. Paths of the respective demand were then considered from class 2 (i.e. Table 4 indicates same capacities as in the conventional minimum spare capacity design for almost all multi-QoP scenarios. Up to 50% of traffic flows can be offered full node failure recovery while maintaining more than 90% of R 1-node for 3/5 th of the remaining demands, with exactly zero penalty over 
E. Effectiveness of the GA-ILP
In experiments conducted, ILP models 3 to 7 were too large for practical solution using the complete set of candidate cycles in Cost239 and Euro graphs. And we faced this problem more often with GPP ILPs 9 to 13, even when conventionally designed Cost239, Bellcore and Euro networks. Large problem instances were addressed within the GA-ILP framework in Section III.D. Fig. 7 shows the GA-ILP convergence for the 2-hop variant of model 5, i.e. 100% R 1-node . In related experiments, partitions of the complete space of candidates correspond to n=6 individuals for Havana, 40 for Cost239, 20 for Italy and Euro networks. The generational process typically completed earlier before the 20 th iteration. For Havana, Italy and Bellcore networks of which exact solutions were known, the GA-ILP solution was always within 1% of optimality. Thus, we trusted the GA-ILP solutions for the Cost239 and Euro networks. (We reached the same conclusions for Cost239, Euro and Bellcore when substituting the constituent p-cycle model Euro for flow, NEPC and GPP approaches.)
V. CONCLUSION
Recent work has revealed a new, relatively simple and possibly cost-effective approach to achieve combined protection of optical networks against both node and span failures. The new principle is based on a generalization of how nodes in a BLSR-ring or p-cycle (to date) derive survivability through loopback at the nearest two neighbor-nodes on the same ring. The generalization views any combination of node failure and an affected transiting path from the standpoint of the 2-hop segment defined by the failure node, and the nodes immediately adjacent on the affected path. We then ask whether these nodes are found together within the same p-cycle as the failure node, or another p-cycle entirely. In any case where they are, we show that the transiting path affected by the node failure is inherently restorable by ordinary pcycle switching actions whether the respective two-hop segment is on-cycle, straddling, or partially on-cycle and partially straddling. The novel combination of GAmethods with ILP was adapted for node-protecting pcycles through 2-hop, flow and NEPCs.
The resulting network designs use only a single set of p-cycle structures that have the same or only slightly more capacity than a corresponding optimal set of pcycles for span protection "only". In this paper, we explained the principle and characterize its effectiveness in terms of network-wide single node failure restorability (R 1-node ) in networks designed only for minimum spare capacity, networks designed for enhanced R 1-node (at min capacity) and networks designed strictly for R 1-node =1. As well, the proposed approach for node-protecting p-cycles is compared to related prior concepts. A subsequent line of future direction is to develop 2-hop protecting p-cycles towards no more distinction between node and span failures.
